List of Articles Mullā Ṣadrā

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  1 - A Critique of Innate Ideas in Descartes’ Philosophy Based on Sadrian Principles
  Maryam  Samadieh عبدالرزاق  حسامی فر
  20.1001.1.20089589.1400.12.1.1.7
  Descartes believed in the existence of innate ideas in human beings. He maintained that the idea of God is the most important of such ideas which He, similar to a dexterous craftsman, has imprinted on our primordial nature (fitrah). The interpreters of Cartesian philoso More

  Descartes believed in the existence of innate ideas in human beings. He maintained that the idea of God is the most important of such ideas which He, similar to a dexterous craftsman, has imprinted on our primordial nature (fitrah). The interpreters of Cartesian philosophy have adopted various methods to interpret the place of innate ideas in Descartes’ philosophy. Based on one of these interpretations, these ideas potentially exist and are present in the soul prior to experiencing them, and their appearance and actuality comes after their sense perception. However, based on another interpretation, the innateness of ideas does not necessarily indicate their permanent presence in the mind as, in this case, no idea can ever be innate. Rather, it means that we are capable of creating such ideas and can perceive their truth through sufficient mental and rational contemplation and needless of the knowledge acquired through the senses. It seems that the first interpretation conforms more to Descartes’ own view as to the potential existence and presence of such ideas. Accordingly, it is inferred that the existence of innate ideas in its Cartesian sense is not consistent with Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles because he denies the existence of any kind of concept and judgement prior to experiencing them in the mind. Moreover, based on Sadrian principles, the human soul is a corporeal substance void of any kind of concept and judgement at the beginning of its creation, but it gradually develops through its trans-substantial motion until it reaches the level of intellectual immateriality. Manuscript profile
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  2 - God’s Will in Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī
  Armin Mansouri Ali Alahbedashti
  20.1001.1.20089589.1400.12.2.2.0
  The howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is More

  The howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate, compare, and evaluate the views of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī in terms of the semantics, origin, and ontology of God’s Will. Ṭūsī maintains that will is the same as motive, which is the same as knowledge of the goodness of act, and thus believes in God’s essential will as an essential attribute. Mullā Ṣadrā also adds the sameness of love with will to the sameness of the knowledge of goodness of act with act and introduces will as an essential attribute. Moreover, he justifies the Infallible Imam’s narrations regarding the sameness of will with act by changing its meaning from having the intention to perform an act to the making and changing of its level from essence to the level of actual existents. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī views the identity of free will with the knowledge of the best system as a verbal conflict and a merely different denomination. He disagrees with equating free will with any essential attribute (such as love) other than knowledge. Thus he maintains that free will is not an essential attribute but is, rather, abstracted from the level of act and is one of its attributes. He also introduces the essence of an act that occurs in the outside or the presence of perfect cause for the act as its source of abstraction. It seems that ٬Allāmah’s change of ontological view of free will and considering it an actual attribute in justifying rational constraints are more accurate than regarding it as an essential attribute without paying attention to the conceptual difference between free will and knowledge and love, which has been propounded by Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadrā. Manuscript profile
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  3 - Theoretical Changes about the Faculty of Estimation in the Course of Historical Development of Islamic Philosophy
  Mohammad-Ali  Ardestani
  20.1001.1.20089589.1400.12.1.8.4
  The faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meani More

  The faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meanings has placed it on top of all inner particular powers. Following a descriptive-analytic evaluation method, the present paper examines the development of the views of Muslim philosophers in this regard. Three important theories stand out in this process. In their quest to attribute a specific source to each kind of perception, Peripatetic philosophers consider the faculty of estimation to be independent from others, place it alongside the faculties of sensation, imagination, and intellect, and emphasize that it can perceive the nature of all specific universals. Accordingly, perceptions are divided in two four sensory, imaginative, estimative, and rational types. Among the followers of the Transcendent Philosophy, some philosophers such as Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī have advocated the Peripatetics on this ground, but Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī have criticized this theory each in their own way. Mullā Ṣadrā has promoted the faculty of estimation to the level of the intellect and placed it at the level of revealed intellect. Accordingly, perceptions are divided into three sensory, imaginative, and rational types. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has attributed the faculty of estimation to the common sense and demoted its status to the level of the senses. He acknowledges the unity of sensory, imaginative, and estimative perceptions. Manuscript profile
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  4 - The Question of the Consistency of Intellectual Arguments and Intuition: Evolution of Fundamental Principles
  Ghasem Pourhasan پورحسن
  20.1001.1.20089589.1401.13.1.8.1
  Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā’s philosophies are based on reason, and the further we go from these two philosophers, intuition and unveiling replace philosophical reasoning. The most important feature of the School of Isfahan is considered to be the synthesis of these two ration More

  Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā’s philosophies are based on reason, and the further we go from these two philosophers, intuition and unveiling replace philosophical reasoning. The most important feature of the School of Isfahan is considered to be the synthesis of these two rational and gnostic approaches. This school of philosophy claims to have integrated philosophical and demonstrative aspects of affairs with religious teachings and, specifically, the Imāmīyah Qur’anic-narrative thoughts. All thinkers of the School of Isfahan have comprehensively explained and extended the Imāmīyah ḥadīth or commented on them based the Qur’anic intellectual wisdom. The secretive and allegorical approach to interpretation became prevalent in Ibn Sīnā’s time; however, writing commentaries on ḥadīths and traditional thoughts are among the unique characteristics of the philosophical school of Isfahan. This method has been in use since then, and some of the prominent post-Sadrian philosophers view writing interpretations and comments on Qur’anic verses as an inseparable part of philosophical tradition. Perhaps, the only exception here who has emphasized the distinction between these two fields is ‘Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Nevertheless, the fundamental question here is whether the School of Isfahan, with Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical system at its center, represents a philosophical and demonstrative school of thought or depends on religious thought and employs argumentation merely to access previously-established and correct thoughts. Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers have paid attention to this problem and emphasized the consistency of these two methods. The most important questions in this discussion include the following: 1) Is the method of rational argument completely different from the religious method? 2) If they are different, which depends on which? 3) Which is the basis in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy: rational reasoning or defending Sharī‘ah and revealed thoughts? How could rational affairs, which can be verified or rejected, and Shar‘ī teachings, which cannot be rejected, be compatible with each other? Here, the author tries to show that Mullā Ṣadrā’s effort to establish this consistency has not been much successful. In fact, in doing so, he has had to either forget about rational reasoning or interpret the religion rationally to prove their consistency. Manuscript profile
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  5 - Historical Background of the Theory of Immutability of Change in the Problem of the Relation of the Changing to the Immutable
  Mahdi Assadi
  20.1001.1.20089589.1401.13.2.5.0
  In Sadrian philosophy the change in motion is the same as its immutability, which justifies the relationship between the changing to the immutable. The question here is whether the theory of immutability of change had any supporters before Mullā Ṣadrā. The main purpose More

  In Sadrian philosophy the change in motion is the same as its immutability, which justifies the relationship between the changing to the immutable. The question here is whether the theory of immutability of change had any supporters before Mullā Ṣadrā. The main purpose of this study is to provide an appropriate response to this question. This theory has been criticized by Muslim thinkers and philosophers for a very long time. Therefore, this paper provides a discussion of the most important of such criticisms based on available evidence. Some scholars have attributed the theory of immutability of change to early philosophers in order to solve the problem of the relation of the changing to the immutable and support their own views, which does not seem to be based on solid evidence. Prior to Mullā Ṣadrā, some philosophers maintained that the heavenly sphere enjoys continuity and fixity in its evolution; however, this cannot be considered as a final resolution to the problem of the relation of the changing to the fixed. Here, the author concludes that the fixity of Sadrian change should be criticized because it leads to accepting a view attributed to Rajol Hamedani about the “universal”. Manuscript profile
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  6 - From Imaginal Faculty to Imagination: A Review of the Evolution of the Concept of Imagination in the Philosophical Systems of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā
  Ibrahim Bazargani
  20.1001.1.20089589.1402.14.1.6.6
  Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of More

  Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of Muslim philosophers from Fārābī to Mullā Ṣadrā. It has even been used in responding to some kalāmī inquiries. Since the very beginning, Muslim philosophers have continuously devoted some of their studies to the investigation and explanation of the whatness and howness of the concept of imagination. However, this concept has not remained immune against change and has developed a distinct meaning in each philosophical system. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the three-fold schools of philosophy (Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationist philosophy, and the Transcendent Philosophy) have each adopted a particular and different approach to this problem. The present study intends to examine the theories of some great figures of Islamic philosophy regarding the whatness of the faculty of imagination and reveal the existing differences among them. The findings indicate that philosophers’ views of the concept of imagination have not been fixed and similar in the course of history, and each has presented a specific and innovative explanation of this concept in conformity with their own philosophical system. For example, Fārābī considered this faculty to be a material component of the soul, while Mullā Ṣadrā changed it into the world of Ideas. This study was conducted following a descriptive-comparative method using library resources. Manuscript profile
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  7 - Aristotelean Roots of the Soul’s Corporeal Origination in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View
  Hamideh  Ansari Hassan Fathi Morteza  Shajari
  20.1001.1.20089589.1402.14.1.7.7
  Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of More

  Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence. Manuscript profile